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Non-technical summary
The promotion of home ownership has for decades been one of the most popular political objectives in the United States. Collins (2002) However, while the objective of public policy is to promote home ownership, episodes of rapid increases in house prices that sometimes occur can have the exact opposite e¤ect on young individuals who are the marginal …rst-time buyers. With a concave age-earnings pro…le, the life cycle of home ownership can be distorted by capital market imperfections which restrict the ability of young households to borrow. Even in the deepest and most liquid mortgage markets, a substantial down-payment up front is required which limits the ability of some households to purchase a home.
Therefore, rapid swings in house prices can have two separate negative e¤ects on young households.
First, rising house prices tighten credit constraints, which could price the marginal …rst-time buyers out of the market. Second, by erasing home equity gains, a housing bust can result in a substantial increase in debt overhang for those young households who purchased a (…rst) home at the height of the boom in order to live the American Dream.
In this paper, we study the economic and social consequences of the recent U.S. housing boom and bust for the cohort of young Americans. We …rst look at how past changes in local house prices (or more precisely, house prices growing faster than income) a¤ect the propensity of young households to purchase a home. Rising house prices tighten credit constraints for …rst-time buyers by increasing the amount of the down-payment, which is usually a …xed percentage of the value of the home, making it more di¢ cult for younger households to buy residential property. We next examine the economic and social consequences of home ownership in the presence of credit constraints. Speci…cally, we study the e¤ect of past changes in house prices on the housing debt, home size, and household formation, both in the short-run and during the subsequent housing bust. 
Introduction
The idea that home ownership is the ful…llment of the American Dream, and that the lasting value of family life is the exclusive privilege of the home owner, has a long tradition in U.S. political discourse, culminating in President George W. Bush's push for an "Ownership Society" during the 2000s. 1 Hardly any other social objective has so consistently been held under the aegis of public policy. Collins (2002) lists 19 home ownership promotion programs enacted during the postDepression years, with ten of those still in place in 2002. Various authors have argued that such policies-coupled with low interest rates and with a decline in mortgage lending standards-may be among the root causes of the unprecedented housing boom that took place in the United States during the late 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s. 2 We argue that while the objective of public policy is to promote home ownership, episodes of rapid increases in house prices and associated boom-bust cycles in housing can have the exact opposite e¤ect on young individuals who are the marginal …rst-time buyers. The life cycle of the demand for housing is well-understood: individuals tend to rent while young, then purchase a starter home when they get a job and start a family, and …nally upgrade to a larger, tradeup home when the number and age of children increases. With a concave age-earnings pro…le, implying that earnings potential grows with age (e.g., Ben-Porath, 1967; Heckman, 1976) , the life cycle of home ownership can be distorted by rising property prices, for two reasons. First, even in the deepest and most liquid mortgage markets, a substantial down payment up front is required, especially from …rst-time buyers. Rising home prices will increase the absolute amount of the down payment, restricting the ability of the marginal …rst-time buyer to purchase residential property. 3 Second, even if lending standards are declining while home prices are increasing, keeping the absolute amount of the down payment constant, 4 rising property prices will increase the size 1 Halfway through his …rst term, President Bush famously set a target of 5.5 million more homeowners that the U.S. government wanted by 2010 (Speech to HUD Employees on National Homeownership Month, June 18, 2002) . 2 See, e.g., Bhutta (2011 Bhutta ( , 2012 and Moulton (2014) . In 2011, the authors of the "Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States" argued that " [T] he sine qua non of the …nancial crisis was U.S. government housing policy, which led to the creation of 27 million subprime and other risky loans -half of all mortgages in the United States -which were ready to default as soon as the massive 1997-2007 housing bubble began to de ‡ate. If the U.S. government had not chosen this policy path -fostering the growth of a bubble of unprecedented size and an equally unprecedented number of weak and high risk residential mortgages -the great …nancial crisis of 2008 would never have occurred." 3 This mechanism has important implications for the e¤ect of income shocks on housing market ‡uctuations (Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997; Lamont and Stein, 1999; Malpezzi, 1999 ; Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 1999). 4 Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2011) and Geanakoplos and Pedersen (2012) provide evidence that down-of the mortgage needed to …nance the purchase, and consequently, increase life-time debt servicing costs. We expect that both mechanisms will price the marginal …rst-time buyers out of the market during a housing boom. At the same time, by erasing home equity gains, a housing bust can result in a substantial increase in debt overhang for those young households who purchased a (…rst) home at the height of the boom in order to live the American Dream.
In this paper, we study the economic and social consequences of the recent U.S. housing boom and bust for the cohort of young Americans. We exploit the enormous spatial heterogeneity in housing price growth during the housing boom. While nationally real home prices rose by more than 50% between 2001 and 2006 (Shiller, 2007) , there were large regional variations: for example, over the same period house prices only increased by 8% in Kokomo, IN, but almost doubled in Miami-Hialeah, FL. We …rst look at how past changes in local house prices (or more precisely, house prices growing faster than income) a¤ect the propensity of young households to purchase a home. Rising house prices should make it more di¢ cult for younger households (who tend to be the marginal …rst-time buyers) to purchase residential property, while the overall e¤ect for older households (who tend to already own residential property) is ambiguous. On the one hand, rising house prices increase home owners' housing wealth, making it easier for them to borrow more without increasing leverage, or to pay o¤ their existing mortgage and move up the property ladder.
On the other hand, rising house prices also raise the size of the required down payment on a trade-up home. We next examine the economic and social consequences of home ownership during housing booms. Speci…cally, we study the e¤ect of past changes in house prices on housing debt, home size, and fertility and marital choices, both in the short-run and during the subsequent housing bust.
Our main …ndings are as follows. First, controlling for changes in income and in rent levels, in 2006 younger individuals were considerably less likely to purchase a home in MSAs where house prices increased substantially between 2001 and 2006. We show that this is due to both theoretical mechanisms outlined, a tightening of credit constraints as the required down payment increases, and a price e¤ect whereby rising home prices increase debt servicing costs. Moreover, we also …nd that in such MSAs, younger individuals were still relatively more constrained in their ability to enter the housing market in 2011, at the trough of the housing boom-bust cycle.
Second, we …nd that younger individuals who did buy a home in MSAs with an above-average payment constraints were indeed eased during the early to mid-2000s. When we compare these e¤ects to the experience of households at later stages of the life cycle, we …nd that older home buyers were more likely to purchase a home, and this home was likely to be larger (in terms of number of bedrooms), in MSAs where house prices increased substantially between 2001 and 2006. This suggests that the increase in home equity driven by the increase in house prices relaxed credit constraints for individuals who were already home owners when the housing boom started and allowed them to move more easily up the property ladder.
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Third, we …nd that an increase in house prices a¤ects negatively marriage and fertility decisions for the majority of the youngest households. In particular, both in 2006 and in 2011, young households in general were considerably less likely to be married and to have a child in MSAs where house prices increased more over the sample period, while young home owners were more likely to have a child in such areas. This is consistent with two mechanisms. First, because children are a normal good, homeowners are more likely to have a child when house prices go up. Second, when house prices go up, families that don't yet own a home experience an adverse wealth shockbecause it will be more expensive for them to buy one eventually-and so with lower wealth, they consume both less housing and fewer kids.
There are non-trivial endogeneity concerns related to the di¤erential impact of credit constraints induced by rising house prices on home ownership across age groups. For example, the areas with the highest increase in house prices tend to also be the ones where the supply of housing is most inelastic, such as coastal cities, and so the housing supply adjusts on the price margin in response to a U.S.-wide shock to housing demand. Because new housing units are di¢ cult to build, individuals in these areas will be less likely to purchase a home than similar individuals in areas with elastic housing supply. This e¤ect will be stronger for younger households who are the marginal …rst-time buyers. A second source of endogeneity can be related to the fact that individuals in such areas may be di¤erent from the rest in ways that matter for the demand for housing. For example, if such areas also have booming economies, then the opportunity cost of having children for young individuals residing in those areas will be higher, weakening their incentives to buy a home. Selection bias can also arise from migration in response to di¤erences in house prices, rents, and income prospects.
While we control for current and expected income, as well as for a wide range of demographic In order to deal with this issue, we employ a novel instrument, namely, the local industrial structure, to extract the exogenous component of locational di¤erences in house price movements.
In particular, we argue that the MSA's share of the working population employed in manufacturing at the start of the period is a good predictor of subsequent MSA-level changes in house prices.
Between 1999 and 2007, the U.S. economy lost 4 million manufacturing jobs (Charles, Hurst, and Notowingo, 2013), an unprecedented decline in manufacturing driven by a rise of low-wage manufacturing in emerging markets (mostly in China). We argue that the U.S.-wide increase in the demand for housing, which coincided with the manufacturing decline, was likely to result in a higher increase in local house prices in MSAs where a smaller share of the working population was employed in manufacturing in the early stages of the boom, i.e., where a smaller share of the workforce was at the risk of becoming unemployed due to the decline in manufacturing. We use this instrument together with another instrument for house prices that is common in the literature, the MSA's topological elasticity of housing supply from Saiz (2010 Their model argues that by a¤ecting the ability of potential …rst-time buyers to enter the housing market, credit constraints can have a strong e¤ect on housing market dynamics. In particular, the down payment constraint can a¤ect the transmission of income shocks to housing transaction. Our main results provide evidence on the link between credit constraints and the propensity of …rst-time buyers to purchase residential property, and we also detect in the data a pattern whereby a rise in existing home owners'housing wealth can a¤ect their propensity to move up the property ladder.
Our work complements and expands along a number of dimensions existing empirical studies on the economic and social e¤ects of ‡uctuations in housing markets. One strand of this literature has linked the U.S. housing boom of the late 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s to household portfolio and labor choices and to changes in the U.S. industrial structure. Mian and Su… (2011) provide evidence on how home equity-based borrowing during the U.S. housing boom of the 1990s and 2000s
was responsible for the large observed increase in housing debt among U.S. households. Chetty
and Szeidl (2012) show that increases in home equity wealth tend to raise share holdings by U.S.
households. Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2013) show that the housing boom allowed for a reallocation of unskilled workers from manufacturing to construction sectors, masking the overall unemployment e¤ect of the U.S. manufacturing decline. Corradin and Popov (2015) show that the rise in home owners'home equity brought about by the housing boom increased the rate of creation of business start-ups. We extend this literature by demonstrating the e¤ect of changes in credit constraints driven by increases in house prices on home ownership choices. We furthermore show how this e¤ect varies over the life cycle.
Another strand of the literature has studied the e¤ect of home ownership and house prices on a range of individual choices, ranging from schooling (Lovenheim, 2011; Laeven and Popov, 2016 In terms of individual housing choices, we use the survey question on whether the household bought residential property in the previous year. We also use the provided information on the value of the purchased home, on the size of the monthly mortgage payment, and on the number of rooms and bedrooms in the newly acquired housing unit. 6 In terms of demographics, we use data on age, gender, marital status, education, and race. We also use data on whether the household had a child in the past year. The latter is only available during the bust phase of the housing market. In terms of …nancials, we use data on the household's total labor income, employment status, and sector of employment. These variables have been shown in previous studies to matter for home ownership choices in the US. 7 Regarding employment, we focus on whether the household head is employed as 5 We considered using alternative sources of household surveys with information on household …nances and expenditures, including the Amercian Housing Survey (AHS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) database, but these all have drawbacks compared to the ACS. The AHS covers too few MSAs (only 47), the SIPP data does not cover the post-boom period (no data for the year 2011), and the PSID covers too few households (only 6,000). 6 We are naturally limited here by the information contained in the ACS survey. For example, there is no information on the amount of mortgage debt but there is information on the monthly mortgage payment. 7 See, for example, Gyourko and Linneman (1996) We compute local house prices using data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which is a repeat-sales housing price index with data for most metropolitan areas. 8 We map the Second, it is conceptually appealing to argue that the e¤ect an increase in the economy-wide demand for housing has on house prices is stronger in MSAs with less elastic housing supply where the adjustment in response to aggregate demand shocks takes place on the price margin. 
Empirical model
Our goal is to explore how changes in house prices a¤ect the probability of purchasing a home for young individuals, the majority of whom do not already own residential property, relative to older individuals who are substantially more likely to already be home owners. We expect changes in house prices to a¤ect di¤erentially households in earlier and in later stages of the life-cycle. The young (marginal …rst-time buyers) will be a¤ected negatively by an increase in house prices because with constant loan-to-value ratios, the down payment constraint will tighten. In addition, even if lending standards decline so that loan-to-value ratios rise to keep the absolute amount of the down ECB Working Paper 1910, May 2016payment unchanged, an increase in house prices will increase debt servicing costs for potential …rst-time buyers. At the same time, an increase in house prices raises housing wealth for existing home owners who tend to be older.
We model the probability of household i in MSA m purchasing a home in 2006 as follows: . We employ a linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at the MSA level. 9 A negative coe¢ cient 1j implies that individuals in age category j are systematically less likely to purchase a home, relative to the control group of individuals older than 65 years. Our main coe¢ cient of interest is 21 . A negative coe¢ cient 21 implies that households in age category 18-35 are systematically less likely to purchase a home if they reside in an MSA that experienced a larger increase in house prices between 2001 and 2006. In robustness tests, we also interact the level of the average MSA-speci…c down payment with the age dummies. This allows us to better distinguish whether rising home prices reduce the young Americans'propensity to purchase residential property through tightening credit constraints (an increase in the down payment) or 9 The results are robust to employing non-linear probability models instead.
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through a plain price e¤ect. Because these households are the ones that are the most likely to not own a home yet, a negative coe¢ cient 21 suggests that housing booms tend to shut them out of the housing market, distorting the life cycle of home ownership.
The propensity of home ownership is of course a¤ected by a number of other factors besides credit constraints and age. Therefore, we make sure that we include an exhaustive set of personal characteristics in the vector X im . In particular, X im includes proxies for gender, marital status, education, and race. We also include proxies for both current and expected income, such as labor income, employment status, and whether the person works in real estate. In this way, our results
are not contaminated by the fact that married individuals and individuals with high expected nonhousing wealth are more likely to purchase a home. Finally, we also include MSA …xed e¤ects.
This enables us to control for systematic di¤erences across geographic regions related to tastes for home ownership vs. renting, or to local changes in house prices.
While a negative coe¢ cient 21 is consistent with the idea that credit constraints negatively a¤ect the ability of young renters to purchase a home, it could also be driven by other forces. For example, the areas with the highest increase in house prices tend to also be the ones where the supply of housing is most inelastic, such as coastal cities. Because new housing units are di¢ cult to build, individuals in these areas will be less likely to purchase a home than similar individuals in areas with elastic housing supply. Alternatively, if such areas also have booming economies, then the opportunity cost of having children for young individuals residing in those areas will be higher, weakening their incentives to buy a home. We address these issues by implementing an current and expected income, to control for the possibility that younger individuals' opportunity cost of time is higher in areas with higher house price changes, leading them to delay both fertility and home ownership decisions.
We also study short-run versus long-run e¤ects. Our results would be much more compelling if younger households were shut out of the housing market not only at the peak of the house price cycle in 2006, but also at its trough in 2011. This would imply that even when house prices revert to previous levels, they do not do so su¢ ciently in order to enable renewed entry into home ownership.
To test for this possibility, in Section 4.4 we test Model (1) using data on demographics and on home purchases in 2011, and studying the e¤ect of changes in house prices between 2001 and 2011.
Finally, we adapt our strategy to test for the economic and social impact of a mechanism whereby credit constraints distort the life cycle of home ownership. In particular, we also explore the e¤ect of past changes in house prices on household leverage-relative to labor income-of new home owners, testing for whether for a unit of housing, younger individuals who decide to buy a house in areas where house prices increased a lot in the past, are more likely to end up with higher housing debt. This would imply that credit constraints impose a two-pronged economic cost on young households: they shut the marginal would-be home owner out of the housing market, and they increase the long-term indebtedness of those with the highest willingness to purchase residential property. We also test for the e¤ect of changes in local house prices on non-economic choices, such as marriage and fertility, both in general and for home owners. If, for example, we 4 Empirical evidence
OLS results
Before we proceed to our parametric estimates of Model (1), we …rst present the raw data. the 254 MSAs in our sample. As seen from the scatter plot, there is a strong negative relationship between the share of young households who entered the housing market and the MSA-wide change in house prices. While only 5% of the households aged 18-35 purchased residential property in an MSA where house prices appreciated by 95% in the past 5 years, 7% of young households did so in an MSA where house prices appreciated by less than 10%. This may at …rst seem like a small di¤erence but one should bear in mind that these are statistics for …rst-time home buyers (not owners) in a given year. The cumulative e¤ect on home ownership for young households that one would obtain when estimating the e¤ect over a longer period of time would be substantially higher. In columns (1) and (2), we report estimates from a parsimonious version of the model where we include the age dummies and their interaction with past house price changes, but without controls for individual demographic characteristics and income. We …rst establish that all households younger than 65+ are considerably more likely on average to purchase a house than household where the head is aged 65+. This is natural given that most demand shocks related to housing choices take place prior to retirement. Regarding the main variable of interest, the estimates strongly imply that past increases in house prices deter younger households (in particular in the age categories 18-35 and 36-45) from purchasing a house. The increase in house prices on its own, in the speci…cation without MSA …xed e¤ects, is uncorrelated with the proportion of young households purchasing a home (column (1)).
In columns (3) and (4), we add all remaining individual-level variables that control for demographic characteristics and for income and wealth. The estimates imply that all else equal, households where the head is female, single, poorly educated, black, and unemployed are less likely to have purchased a home in the past year. In addition, having a job in real estate is associated with a considerably higher probability of purchasing a house. This is likely because a real estate job in a booming area is a proxy for higher expected income, because real estate agents have inside knowledge of the market and can cherry pick, or because a real estate agent is expected to own a home to signal success to clients. Our main result still obtains in the richest empirical speci…cation, with proxies for demographics and …nancials and with MSA …xed e¤ects (column (4) are considerably more likely to do so. As such households are unlikely to be …rst-time buyers, the latter e¤ect is consistent with the idea of households extracting the additional home equity from their existing home and investing in a trade-up home, or with home equity enabling them to move residence for economic reasons.
The results for the youngest households are consistent with two separate mechanisms: a tightening of credit constraints, whereby rising house prices increase the size of the down payment necessary to obtain a mortgage, and a plain price e¤ect, whereby raising house price increase debt servicing costs. In Table 3 , we attempt to separate the two e¤ects by adding interactions of the age dummies with an MSA-speci…c down payment proxy in Model (1) . Individuals in the IPUMS do not disclose information on down payments, and it is not possible to construct one because the size of the mortgage is not reported, either. Therefore, we turn to another data set, the Survey between property value and mortgage size, and then we calculate an MSA-speci…c average. The mean MSA-speci…c down payment in the sample is rather high, at 31% (corresponding to a loan-tovalue ratio of 0.69), re ‡ecting the fact that a higher down payment is required of young (…rst-time)
buyers, and it ranges from a low of 5% to a high of 76%. We then interact the age dummies with this variable and include it in the main regression. The estimates from this regression, reported
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in Column (1) of Table 4 , indeed suggest that the size of the down payment is negatively related to the probability of home purchase, and more so for the youngest individuals. When included alongside the interaction of age dummies and changes in home prices (column (2)), the e¤ect of the down payment is still negative and signi…cant at the 1% statistical level for the youngest household. Importantly, the negative e¤ect of positive shocks to home prices on the youngest households' home purchase probability still obtains, and we also detect a strong positive e¤ect on household heads aged 45+. Given that we formally control for the e¤ect of the down payment constraints, the interaction of age dummies with house prices now captures a plain price e¤ect related to debt servicing.
Overall, our results suggest that a housing boom has di¤erent e¤ects on the propensity to acquire residential property, depending on whether the household has experienced an increase in housing wealth on its existing property. The e¤ect on older households is positive, suggesting that an increase in housing wealth allows them to purchase a new property more easily. The e¤ect on younger households is negative, and it operates both through a tightening of credit constraints e¤ect and a plain pricing e¤ect. Because the speci…cation includes MSA …xed e¤ects, we are con…dent that the main e¤ect holds independent of any region-wide di¤erences in economic conditions or housing supply that a¤ect all agents equally.
2SLS results
While the estimates reported in Table 2 support the idea that positive shocks to house prices a¤ect negatively the ability of households to purchase a home, this e¤ect could be driven by a number of other factors. For example, the supply of housing tends to be the most inelastic in areas which experience large house prices increases (such as Miami or San Francisco), both due to land scarcity and to more stringent regulations on construction. Because the supply of new houses adjusts slowly to positive shocks to housing demand, individuals in such areas will be less likely to purchase a home than similar individuals in areas with more elastic housing supply. The estimates we reported can be contaminated by such omitted variable bias. of housing supply from Saiz (2010). Then we use the predicted change in house prices in the second stage. We expect that an economy-wide shock to the demand for housing should have a weaker impact on house prices in depressed manufacturing areas. The reason is that in such areas a smaller fraction of the workforce is at risk of becoming unemployed due to the general decline in manufacturing. We also expect that such a shock should increase house prices more in MSAs with less elastic housing supply where the adjustment in response to aggregate demand shocks takes place on the price margin, while in ‡at areas with abundant land (and thus elastic housing supply) the adjustment will take place on the quantity margin. Table 4 reports the estimates from this alternative model. We begin by reporting, in columns Columns (4) and (5) large increase in house prices in the past 5 years. In our preferred speci…cation with demographics, …nancials, and MSA …xed e¤ects (column (5)), this e¤ect obtains only for the youngest households (age [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . The magnitude of the estimate is similar to the one reported in Table 2 , suggesting that in this case, omitted variable bias is not a serious econometric issue. However, we no longer …nd a di¤erential e¤ect, across MSAs, for the group of old households (age category 56-65).
The validity of the identi…cation strategy rests on the assumption that the local beginningof-period share of employment in manufacturing and the local elasticity of housing supply are legitimate instruments for changes in house prices in Model (1). The …rst-stage estimates reported in Columns (1)- (3) of Table 4 suggest that the instruments are strongly related to changes in house prices. However, for the 2SLS estimate to be consistent, it must also be the case that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residual in Model (1) . If the instruments in ‡uence the probability of purchasing residential property for reasons other than tightening credit constraints or rising debt servicing costs, brought about by changes in property prices, our approach is called into question. As a way of addressing this concern, we note that if the only impact of the instruments is through changes in house prices, then the instruments should be insigni…cant if included in Model (1) . Column (6) reports the estimates from this reduced form model. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the joint e¤ect of the local industry structure and of the local elasticity of housing supply on home ownership equals zero, supporting the use of our instrumental variables approach.
Controlling for rent and income e¤ects
While the speci…cation so far allows us to control for income e¤ects, it does not allow us to control for income e¤ects that vary across age groups or MSAs. For example, it is possible that younger households have higher incomes in areas with booming housing markets, raising their opportunity cost of child rearing. This may in turn weaken their incentives to enter the housing market. It is therefore important to test a speci…cation where both current and expected incomes are allowed to have a di¤erential e¤ect on various age groups. Finally, it is possible that younger households are more risk averse investors, and so they are more likely to postpone the purchase of a house when prices are high, even though they are not credit constrained. In column (5), we interact all age categories with a dummy equal to 1 if the household head has a college degree or more. In this case, higher education proxies for both higher current income and higher future income because skilled agents tend to have higher lifetime earnings and face more stable income streams. We con…rm that individuals of all age categories are more likely to buy residential property if they have at least a college degree. Importantly, the e¤ect of past changes in house prices on housing choices by the youngest households survives the inclusion of these control variables.
The last two columns of Table 5 report the estimates from a horse race regression where we include the interactions of all empirical proxies for investment opportunities and for current and future income with the age categories. We continue to observe a strong negative association for young households between past increases in house prices and propensity to enter home ownership. This is true both in the OLS regression (column (6)) and in the IV regression (column (7)). In both speci…cations, the di¤erential e¤ect across MSAs is also observed in the case of age category 36-45, implying that rising property house prices can deter home ownership in later stages of the home ownership cycle, too. 10 
Long-run e¤ects
Is the negative e¤ect of housing booms on young households' propensity to purchase residential property long-lasting? In particular, even at the trough of the housing bust in 2011, house prices remained substantially above their levels before the crisis. This raises the possibility that housing booms can lead to situations whereby young households are shut out of housing markets long after the housing boom is over. Evidence already suggests that areas which experienced the largest runup of house prices also experienced the deepest recessions and the largest increases in unemployment (Midrigan and Philippon, 2011), an e¤ect largely attributed to leverage accumulated through home equity borrowing. If the results we have found so far extend to 2011, this would suggest that housing booms have a long-lasting negative e¤ect even on groups of individuals (young households) who did not increase their housing debt during the boom in order to …nance increased consumption.
We test for this possibility in Table 6 . Speci…cally, we estimate a version of Model (1) and 2011 on the probability of purchasing a house in 2011 for young households. This is the case both in the OLS (column (1)) and in the IV (column (2)) speci…cation. Numerically, the e¤ect is about half the size of the one for the 2006 sample of households, and it is signi…cant at least at the 5% statistical level. Our results thus suggest that housing booms can impose a long-lasting externality on agents who do not bene…t directly from the booms.
Extensions
In this section, we analyze the consequences of rising house prices across age groups for households who purchased a home in the previous year. We …rst examine whether for agents who become home owners, rising house prices a¤ect the characteristics of the housing unit purchased. Then we study the economic implications of home ownership in terms of the amount of housing debt of the household. Finally, we look at the social implications of home ownership by examining the marital and fertility choices of young households in booming areas.
Home ownership, house value and housing size
We …rst address the question of whether rising house prices a¤ect the value and the size of residential (the intensive margin), albeit the data provide no evidence that mortgage deductions a¤ect the rate of home ownership (the extensive margin). We hypothesize that rising house prices can a¤ect either the value of the purchased home, if households choose to economize in the price dimension, the size of the purchased home, if households choose to economize in the quantity dimension, or both. Table 7 reports the estimates from a version of Model (1) run on the sample of new home owners only. Moreover, rather than estimating the probability of purchasing a house, we test for the e¤ect of age and of house prices on a range of housing characteristics. Namely, we examine the heterogeneous impact of rising house prices on the value and on the size of the purchased home, where size is proxied by the number of room and by the number of bedrooms in the residential unit. 11 We present evidence from OLS estimation in Panel A, and from an IV procedure in Panel B.
Column (1) reports that in areas which experienced a large increase in house prices in the …rst half of the 2000s, new home owners of all age groups were more likely to purchase a more expensive house than in areas where house prices increased by less. While the average e¤ect is natural given the di¤erence in equilibrium house prices, we also …nd that this e¤ect is substantially stronger for younger households (age category 18-35) than for older ones (age category 56-65). This suggests that while younger households are more constrained than older ones in areas where house prices increased considerably, actual transactions (conditional on buying a home) are associated with relatively higher house values. Alternatively, the results suggest that otherwise identical households, in terms of demographics and income, end up purchasing substantially more expensive residential units in areas with large past house price appreciations.
The next two columns of Table 7 test for the e¤ect of rising house prices on housing unit size.
The evidence suggests that for the youngest households (age 18-35), rising house prices have no impact on the intensive margin of home ownership. In particular, relative to young households in areas where house prices did not increase by much, young households in areas where house prices increased substantially do not acquire a larger house, as proxied by the number of rooms (column 1 1 We do not have information on the square footage of each home.
(2)) and the number of bedrooms (column (3)). The e¤ect of past changes in house prices on housing value for …rst-time home owners is thus observed only in the price dimension. This suggests that …rst-time home owners in boom areas tend to purchase more expensive homes per unit of housing.
At the same time, households in the age categories 35-45 and 46-55 acquire residential property with strictly more bedrooms relative to similar households in control areas (column (3)). This result obtains both when we estimate the model using OLS (Panel A) and when we estimate it using IV (Panel B). To the extent that such households are unlikely to be …rst-time home owners, the evidence suggests that housing booms increase home owners'housing wealth and make it easier for them to climb up the property ladder.
Home ownership and household leverage
We next examine the implications of rising house prices for the resulting household leverage of young households. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the youngest households with the highest willingness to purchase residential property will end up with higher household leverage in areas with rapidly rising house prices. At the same time, because booming areas are characterized by more dynamic local economies and, as a result, by higher average incomes (Mian and Su…, 2009 ), the predicted e¤ect of house price changes on household debt relative to household income is ambiguous.
In Table 8 , we report evidence related to this particular consequence of home ownership. We …rst look at the e¤ect of changes in house prices on the monthly mortgage payment relative to monthly income in 2006 (…rst two columns), and then we look at the same e¤ect in 2011 (last two columns of Table 8 
IV (column (4)).
Overall, the evidence in Tables 7 and 8 is consistent with the idea that housing booms restrict the share of young …rst-time home owners to those with the highest willingness to pay for a unit of housing. Such households end up accumulating substantial amounts of mortgage debt relative to income, too. At the same time, our results also suggest that an increase in house prices provides existing home owners with additional housing wealth that can be extracted in order to (potentially) switch from a start-up to a trade-up home, where a trade-up home is proxied by a residential unit with a higher number of bedrooms than the previous home. For such households, the positive income e¤ect of additional home equity seems to mildly dominate the negative e¤ect of tightening credit constraints and of higher debt servicing costs, although results are not robust across speci…cations.
Social implications of home ownership during a housing boom
We now turn to the social implications of acquiring a home during a housing boom. Speci…cally, in Table 9 we study the di¤erential e¤ect across age groups of past increases in house prices on households'fertility and marriage decisions. Recent research has provided compelling evidence that positive shocks to the value of the residential property raise home-owners'probability of having a child, consistent with the idea that children are a "normal good" (Becker, 1960; Lovenheim and Mumford, 2013; Dettling and Kearney, 2014). There is no evidence so far, however, on the e¤ect of house prices on the fertility of non-home owners by age groups. In addition, recent evidence has suggested that positive shocks to house prices tend to increase marital stability (Milosch, 2014 ).
Farnham, Schmidt, and Sevak (2011) qualify this result by arguing that the e¤ect is asymmetric across age categories, which they argue is a proxy for home ownership. In comparison, our data allow us to actually focus on a sample of home owners and examine the e¤ect of shocks to house prices on marriage.
We modify regression model (1) such that the dependent variable is, alternatively, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is married 12 ("marriage equation") and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household had a child last year ("fertility equation"). We perform both an analysis of the peak (Panel A) and an analysis of the trough of the housing cycle (Panel B). We estimate the marriage equation and the fertility equation using a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions framework 1 2 We need to note that unmarried partners are not identi…ed in the ACS.
where the two equations are estimated as a simultaneous system, together with the main homeownership equation (1) . In addition, we estimate a model where we use the beginning-of-period MSA-level share of manufacturing employment and the MSA-level elasticity of housing supply as instruments for changes in house prices. Expanding further on our empirical strategy so far, we distinguish between home owners and renters. We do so in order to investigate two separate mechanisms. The …rst one is related to rising house prices providing a positive wealth shock to home owners. Because children are a normal good, homeowners-and in particular younger onesare more likely to have a child when house prices go up. The second one is related to rising house prices providing an adverse wealth shock to families that do not own a house yet, because it will be more expensive for them to buy one eventually. With lower overall wealth, such families consume both less housing and fewer kids, and as a consequence are more likely to postpone getting married, too.
Column (1) of Panel A of Table 9 suggests that, consistent with the second mechanism, the Turning to fertility choices, column (3) of Panel A suggests that in 2006, households in age categories 36-45 were more likely to have a child if they reside in areas that saw large house price increases in the past …ve years, relative to identical households residing in areas that did not experience large recent house price appreciations. As such households are more likely to already own property, the evidence is consistent with a mechanism whereby an increase in house prices constitutes a positive wealth shock to home owners and whereby children are a normal good.
However, the opposite is true for households aged 18-35, and the e¤ect is signi…cant at the 10% statistical level in the IV speci…cation (column (4)), suggesting that for most (non-home-owning) young households, rising house prices provide an adverse wealth shock, making it more expensive for them to buy property in the future and leading them to consume less housing and fewer children.
Completing the analysis, columns (3) and (4) (4)). Moreover, the numerical e¤ect for 2011 is considerably larger than the one for 2006. We conclude that rising property prices not only a¤ect negatively the youngest individuals'probability of becoming home owners, but also lead them to postpone marriage and fertility.
Conclusion
We study the e¤ect of rising house prices on the life cycle of home ownership, as well as on marriage and fertility, di¤erentiating by age. Past increases in house prices increase debt servicing costs, and they can also tighten credit constraints by increasing the amount of cash that one needs to pay up front in order to buy a home. For 1.5 million households in the United States in 2006 (the peak of the housing boom), we evaluate the e¤ect of past shocks to local house prices at di¤erent stages of the household's life cycle. We focus on the youngest households (age 18-35) because they are the most likely to be the marginal …rst-time buyers. We test whether housing booms distort home ownership choices for these households, as well as whether they have negative consequences in terms of debt levels and whether they distort the demographic dynamics.
We also introduce a novel instrument for house prices changes based on the predetermined local industrial structure. In particular, we use the beginning-of-period local share of manufacturing employment to extract the exogenous component of subsequent local changes in house prices. We argue that the U.S.-wide increase in the demand for housing, which coincided with the manufacturing decline of the 2000s, was likely to result in a higher increase in local house prices in MSAs where a smaller share of the working population was employed in manufacturing in the early stages of the boom, i.e., where a smaller share of the workforce was at the risk of becoming unemployed due to the decline in manufacturing. We use this instrument together with the other instrument for house prices that is common in the literature, the MSA's topological elasticity of housing supply from Saiz (2010).
Our evidence suggests that higher prices on residential property reduce the probability of becoming a …rst-time home owner, proxied by a lower propensity to purchase a home among the youngest households (age category [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . This e¤ect operates through two channels: a tightening of credit constraints due to rising down payments, and a plain price e¤ect whereby rising house
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prices increase debt servicing costs. The result is not driven by investment opportunities, by income e¤ects, or by demographic characteristics. The e¤ect still obtains when we use the local industrial structure and the local elasticity of housing supply as instruments for changes in house prices. It is also long-lasting, as young households residing in areas that experienced a larger overall increase in house prices between 2001 and 2011 were relatively more likely to be deterred from purchasing residential property as late as 2011 (the trough of the house price boom-bust cycle). We also …nd that young households that decided to acquire a home at the peak of the housing boom in areas
with rapidly increasing house prices ended up with higher mortgage debt per unit of income, but not necessarily with a larger property. Finally, young households in general were considerably less likely be married and to have a child-both in 2006 and in 2011-in MSAs where house prices increased substantially after 2001. This is consistent with a mechanism whereby when house prices go up, families that do not own a home experience an adverse wealth shock-because it will be more expensive for them to buy one eventually-and so with lower wealth, they consume both less housing and fewer kids. At the same time older households, which tend to be home owners already when the boom started, were more likely to purchase a home, and this home was on average larger than in non-booming areas, suggesting a positive income e¤ect, through increased home equity, for home owners wishing to move up the property ladder.
Our results paint a moderately dark picture of the "American Dream" in the presence of housing boom-bust cycles, in the case of young individuals. It suggests that housing booms tend to distort the life cycle of home ownership by pricing out young households from the housing market.
By making it di¢ cult to transition from renting to owning, house price booms also distort young individuals'marriage and fertility choices. Finally, the young households with the highest willingness to purchase a home end up with substantially higher debt during the bust phase of housing cycles. Given the crucial role public policy and …nancial sector imperfections play in determining individual home ownership incentives, a systematic analysis of the macroeconomic implications of housing boom-bust episodes is needed. We leave these important questions for future research. for the main variables used in the empirical tests. 'Purchased a home last year' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household purchased a house in the previous year. 'Age 18-35' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is between 18 and 35 years old. 'Age 36-45' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is between 36 and 45 years old. 'Age 46-55' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is between 46 and 55 years old. 'Age 56-65' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is between 56 and 65 years old. 'Age 65+' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is over 65 years old. 'Female' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a female. 'Single' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is single. 'Divorced' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is divorced. 'College or more' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least a college degree. 'College drop-out' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head dropped out from college. 'White' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is white. 'Black' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is black. 'Asian' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is Asian. 'Income' is the total household income. 'Unemployed' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is unemployed. 'Real estate job' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is employed in real estate. 'House value' is the total value of the house. 'Mortgage payment' is the value of the monthly payment on the household's mortgage. 'No. rooms' is the total number of rooms in the household's home. 'No. bedrooms' is the total number of bedrooms in the household's home. 'Child born last year' is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household had a child born in the previous year. 'Single' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is single. 'Divorced' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is divorced. 'College or more' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head has at least a college degree. 'College drop-out' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head dropped out from college. 'White' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is white. 'Black' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is black. 'Log (Income)' is the natural logarithm of total household income. 'Unemployed' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is unemployed. 'Real estate job' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is employed in real estate. Data are from IPUMS, for 2006. Standard errors clustered by MSA are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. is the natural logarithm of total household income. 'Real estate job' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is employed in real estate. 'College or more' is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head has at least a college degree. All remaining household controls from Table 2 are included in the regressions. In column (7), '∆5-year house price' is instrumented using 'Share manufacturing in 2001' and 'MSA elasticity' (see Table 3 Table 2 are included in the regressions. In Column (2), '∆10-year house price' is instrumented using 'Share manufacturing in 2001' and 'MSA elasticity' (see Table 3 for details). Data are from IPUMS, for 2011. Standard errors clustered by MSA are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. (1)); the number of rooms in the house (column (2) Table 2 are included in the regressions. In Panel B, '∆5-year house price' is instrumented using 'Share manufacturing in 2001' and 'MSA elasticity' (see Table 3 for details). Data are from IPUMS, for 2006. Standard errors clustered by MSA are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Table 2 are included in the regressions. In columns (2) and (4), '∆5-year house price' and '∆10-year house price' are instrumented using 'Share manufacturing in 2001' and 'MSA elasticity' (see Table 3 for details). Data are from IPUMS, for 2006 (columns (1) and (2)) and for 2011 (columns (3) and (4)). The sample is restricted to households who bought a home at the height of the boom. Standard errors clustered by MSA are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Table 2 are included in the regressions. Columns (1) and (3) report estimates from Seemingly Unrelated Regressions where the marriage equation (column (1)) and the fertility equation (column (3)) are estimated simultaneously together with the main home-ownership equation. In columns (2) and (4), '∆5-year house price' and '∆10-year house price' are instrumented using 'Share manufacturing in 2001' and 'MSA elasticity' (see Table 3 for details). Data are from IPUMS, for 2006 (Panel A), and for 2011 (Panel B). Standard errors clustered by MSA are reported in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
